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COMMENT
IN RE GAULT AND THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION IN JUVENILE COURT
INTRODUCTION

In this era of unparalleled recognition of individual rights, it should
ostensibly be difficult, if not impossible, to select the area of the law
upon which the weight of recent constitutional pronouncements has
been felt most significantly. However, such is not the case as it can
hardly be doubted that the field of juvenile law has undergone the most
extensive reshaping of any field of law. The changes necessitated by
the recent Supreme Court decisions are not merely concerned with
isolated activity related to the perimeter of the field but rather are of
the most fundamental nature.
It will be the scope of this article to discuss the status of the juvenile
court system, necessarily encompassing a brief history of juvenile law
in general, in relationship to the recent opinion of In re Gault,' a case
of monumental importance in the constitutional realm of our jurisprudence. In re Gault will serve as the basis of this discussion, as any discussion of the present status of juvenile law necessarily must be structured. Constitutional issues of due process abound in In re Gault, but
the focal point of this article will be limited to one of these issues, with
the hope of attaining some degree of depth of presentation and meaningfulness of discussion. The issue to be developed: Self-Incrimination.
BACKGROUND

In order to understand the significance of In re Gault, one must
consider the beginnings of juvenile law and the context from whence
it arose. Prior to 1899, there were no juvenile courts, the first
juvenile court in the entire world being established in 1899 in Cook
County, Illinois. Prior to the creation of the juvenile courts, the
criminal law and penalties, in general, applied to children over 14 in
the same manner as they were applied to adults. There were exceptions
to this adult treatment in that the chancellor, in English practice, could
exempt the child, a practice which was followed in the United States
until 1899. The ramifications of the general rule of adult treatment of a
juvenile offender become more significant when it is considered that
over 300 crimes were punishable by death at this time. The harshness
of adult procedures and penalties, and the basic unreasonableness of
mixing children on long prison sentences with hardened criminals led
to the action of the Illinois legislature in 1899.
What was the nature of this new offspring, an innovation which
Dean Roscoe Pound called ".

.

. the greatest step forward in the ad-

ministration of Anglo-Saxon justice since the signing of the Magna
1387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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Charta." From its very beginning, the juvenile court has been based on
the philosophy of "individualized justice." This means that the individuality of the child is recognized in the court's disposition of the child,
necessitating the court's consideration of sociology, psychology, biology,
and even medicine. Each of these sciences must play a part in the court's
disposition if "individualized justice" is to be realized. Fundamental
also to this concept is the purpose to which juvenile court procedures are
directed: the juvenile court is a remedial tool, and to a degree preventive
rather than punitive. It must be admitted, however, that practically
speaking it is difficult to eliminate the punitive element. Nevertheless,
the question is not what can be done to a child, but what can be done
for him. The problem of determination by the judge is not, "Has this
boy or girl committed a specific wrong," but "what is he, how has he
become what he is, and what had best be done in his interest and in
the interest of the state to save him from a downward career."' 2 Thus,
it is realized that there is a substantial difference between an isolated
act and a developing pattern of anti-social behavior, e.g., the difference
between group'acts of superficial vandalism and destruction of property
or fire-setting. For children, especially young boys, have a tendency
to become somewhat inventive in mischief and this, together with the
"mob psychology" factor and the "daring" which is inevitable, occasionally results in acts of superficial vandalism. Though this is neither admirable nor acceptable behavior, it is a far cry from a rebellious attitude
toward society and a developing pattern of anti-social behavior. As a
consequence, the court would be justified in treating two boys differently
even though they have done exactly the same thing.
This theory of "individualized justice," however admirable in theory,
has resulted in conflicting views as to the essential nature of the juvenile
court proceeding. For the emphasis on "individualized justice" is the
basis for the traditional view of the juvenile court proceeding as an
informal non-adversary session with a kindly white-haired judge with
no need for technical rules of procedure and evidence, allegedly because
such technicalities would destroy the "effectiveness" of the session. 3
The sins against humanity, particularly youths, which have been committed under the guise of this standard, are only now coming to the
fore. It is now generally felt that the juvenile court should be recognized
for what it is, a court of law, and that the rules of procedure and evidence
must necessarily be adhered to if any semblance of justice is to be
attained in such proceedings.4 Roscoe Pound, in 1937, wrote: "The
2 Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REv. 104, 119-120 (1909).

3 This philosophy was undoubtedly a "backlash" from the pre-1899 treatment
of children in adult criminal courts. As to the inadequacy of such a judge
without other measures, see Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966 Sup. CT. REv. 167.
4 See Note, Transfer of Juveniles to Adult CorrectionalInstitutions, 1966 Wis.
L. Ray. 866, 868. "This over-all emphasis on the rehabilitative goal and the
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powers of the Star Chamber were a trifle in comparison with those of
our juvenile courts." 5 (Emphasis added.) And Felix Frankfurter, in
his oft-quoted statement said: "The history of American freedom is, in
no small measure, the history of procedure." 6
This emphasis upon the child's interest in individualized justice
does not mean that he is the sole interested party in the juvenile
court determination. The matter is stated quite well in the Wisconsin
statutes: "The best interests of the child shall always be of paramount
consideration but the court shall also consider the interest of the parents
or guardian of the child and the interest of the public."7 (Emphasis
added.) An example of an instance where the interests of the child and
his parents are not identical: where the parents want to retain custody
and the child's best interests would be served by placing him in the
custody of more responsible adults or an institution. Thus we have a
minimum of three interested parties in every juvenile proceeding: the
child, his parents or guardian, and the public. That the interest of the
parent, guardian, and public are to be weighed heavily cannot be doubted.
Perhaps the most direct conflict in these "interests" is between the
child's interest and the interest of the public in being protected, a problem which involves the delicate balancing of individual rights and society's rights. Again, although the interest of the child is paramount, the
public has a right to be protected from unnecessary threats to person
or property.
Another important concept in juvenile court philosophy is that of
"parens patriae," the principle that the state is "father of the country."
When the child's parents or guardian cannot provide the necessities of
life, the state steps into their shoes, as it were, and assumes the parental
responsibilities. It is important to note that these necessities are of a
moral and emotional nature as well as physical, and thus if these necessities are not furnished by the child's parents or guardian, the state has
the responsibility to see that the child is provided with them. The
validity and efficacy of the "parens patriae" theory has been criticized
extensively, and would seem to be a mere constitutionally necessary corollary to the non-adversary theory of juvenile proceedings. The significance of this theory upon the development of juvenile law is awesome,
as the state's authority when occupying the status of parens partiae has
been almost unlimited:
corresponding de-emphasis on procedural regularity has led to one major
criticism of the juvenile system: flexibility is achieved only at the expense of
sacrificing the juvenile's right to be deprived of his liberty only if it is determined, by procedures consistent with due process of law, that he had violated society's rules." (Emphasis added.)
s Foreword to YOUNG, SOCIAL TREATMENT IN PROBATION AND DELINQUENCY
(1937).
6 Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945) (concurring opinion).
7 WIS. STAT. §48.01(3) (1965).
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Generally, the courts have treated the problem of a child's
right to liberty in terms of the parent's right to custody of the
child. .

.

. The proposition that the child may not assert rights

against the state acting as parens patriae follows from analogy to
the parent-child relationship. [T]he child is not entitled, either
by the laws of nature or of the State, to absolute freedom, but
is subjected to the restraint and custody of a natural or legally
constituted guardian to whom it owes obedience and subjection. s
Whether the noble goals of this theory have been attained has been
doubted of late.
While there can be no doubt of the original laudable purpose
of juvenile courts, studies and critiques in recent years raise
serious questions as to whether actual performance measures
well enough against theoretical purpose to make tolerable the
immunity of the process from the reach of constitutional guarantees applicable to adults. There is much evidence that some
juvenile courts lack the personnel, facilities, and techniques to
perform adequately as representatives of the State in a parens
patriae capacity, at least with respect to children charged with
law violation.9
With the foregoing as a basic framework, it is possible to consider
the first juvenile law case which the Supreme Court decided to handle:
Kent v. United States. 10 Until Kent, the Supreme Court had never
passed upon the legality of juvenile court procedures or of police practices respecting juveniles.:' Kent considered the requirements for a valid
waiver of the "exclusive" jurisdiction of the juvenile court of the
District of Columbia to the adult criminal court of the District. The
facts indicated that the defendant 16-year-old boy had been arrested
on charges of housebreaking, robbery and rape and interrogated for
quite some time while under jurisdiction of the juvenile court. In the
course of this day and a half of questioning, he admitted participation
in various felonies. As a juvenile he was subject to the exclusive juris8 Note, The Parens Patriae Theory and Its Effect on the Constitutional Limits

of Juvenile Court Powers, 27 Pirr. L. REv. 887, 909 (1966). In accord: People
v. Dotson, 46 Cal.2d 891, 299 P.2d 875 (1956).
9 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555-556 (1966). See also, Antieau, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46 CORNFELL L. Q. 387, 392 (1961):
"The record of juvenile court judges and authorities is not such that we
can safely go on theorizing that constitutional rights are unnecessary. It may
be that the alarming recidivism of children exposed to the juvenile courts
is due in part at least to the kind of justice administered in these institutions."
10383 U.S. 541 (1966).
11 Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases,
1966 Sup. CT. Rrv. 167. However, basic constitutional issues have been presented to state courts, and over forty state supreme courts have upheld the
local variants of juvenile court laws against the claim that the statutes violated the state and/or the federal constitution. Witness: Lindsay v. Lindsay,
257 Del. 328 (1913); Mill v. Brown, 31 Utah 473 (1907); In re Sharp, 15
Idaho 120 (1908); Wissenberg v. Bradley, 209 Iowa 813 (1929); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48 (1905) ; Cope v. Campbell, 175 Ohio St. 475, 196

N.E.2d 457 (1964).
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diction of the District of Columbia Juvenile Court unless, as the District
of Columbia statute provides, that court after "full investigation" should
waive jurisdiction over him and remit him for trial to the United States
District Court of the District of Columbia. Defendant's counsel filed a
motion in the Juvenile Court for a hearing on the question of waiver,
and for access to the Juvenile Court's Social Service file which had been
accumulated on the defendant during his probation for a prior offense.
The Juvenile Court did not rule on these motions and entered an order
waiving jurisdiction, stating that this was done after the required "full
investigation." In holding the order of the Juvenile Court to be invalid,
the Court relied heavily on the federal statute and yet the constitutional
overtones of the decision have become the focal point of the case.
"... As a condition to a valid waiver order, petitioner was entitled to a
hearing, including access by his counsel to the social records and probation or similar reports which presumably are considered by the court,
and to a statement of reasons for the Juvenile Court's decision. We believe that this result is required by the statute read in the context of
constitutional principles relating to due process and the assistance of
counsel.12 And, ". .. it [statute] assumes procedural regularity sufficient
in the particular circumstances to satisfy the basic requirements of due
process and fairness. . . ."13 Thus, although the decision turned upon
the language of the statute, the court emphasized the necessity that "the
basic requirements of due process and fairness" be satisfied in such
proceedings. Since the decision did not have to be based upon this issue,
there was no further spelling out of what was required by "due process
and fairness" in regard to presently existing juvenile court procedures
and practices.14 Much consternation was caused by this phrase; constitutional implications of the present methods were definitely in the
wind.15 Although much soul searching was instigated, "due process and
fairness" remained an unknown quantity until the decision which constitutes the landmark of juvenile law: In re Gault.
In re Gault was taken on an appeal from a judgment of the supreme
court of Arizona affirming the dismissal of a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. The petition sought the release of Gerald Francis Gault,
petitioner's 15-year-old son, who had been committed as a juvenile delinquent to the State Industrial School by the juvenile court of Gila
County, Arizona. The supreme court of Arizona affirmed dismissal of
12 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 557 (1966).
13 Id. at 553.
3.4Lest opponents of the Kent decision draw undue solace from the narrow 5-4
decision, it must be pointed out that the 4 dissenters agreed with the principles
espoused, but dissented on the theory that the Courts' general practice of
leaving undisturbed decisions of the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia concerning the meaning of legislation designed to govern the District, should be followed.
15 Gardner, The Kent Case and the Juvenile Court: A Challenge to Lawyers,
52 A.B.A. . 923 (1966).
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the writ against various arguments which included an attack upon the
constitutionality of the Arizona Juvenile Code because of its alleged
denial of procedural rights to juveniles charged with being "delinquents."
The Arizona court agreed that the constitutional guarantee of due process
of law is applicable to such proceedings, holding that the Arizona Juvenile Code is to be read as "impliedly" implementing the "due process
concept." It then proceeded to identify and describe "the particular elements which constitute due process in a juvenile hearing," concluding
that the proceedings ending in commitment of Gerald Gault did not
offend these requirements.
The facts of Gault must be detailed before further consideration is
possible. On Monday, June 8, 1964, at about 10:00 a.m., 15-year-old
Gerald Gault and a friend, Ronald Lewis, were taken into custody by
the Sheriff of Gila County, Arizona. Gerald was then subject to a six
months' probation order which had been entered on February 25, 1964,
as a result of his having been in the company of another boy who had
stolen a wallet from a lady's purse. The police action on June 8 was
taken as the result of a verbal complaint by a neighbor of the boys, Mrs.
Cook, about a telephone call made to her in which the caller or callers
made lewd or indecent remarks of a sexual nature.
At the time Gerald was picked up, his mother and father were both
at work. No notice that Gerald was being taken into custody was left
at the home and no other steps were taken to advise them that their
son had, in effect, been arrested. Gerald was taken to the Children's
Detention Home. When his mother arrived home at 6 p.m., Gerald was
not home. Gerald's older brother was sent to look for him at the home
of the Lewis family where he learned that Gerald was in custody. He
so informed his mother and the two of them went to the Detention
Home. The deputy probation officer, Flagg, who was also superintendent
of the Detention Home, told Mrs. Gault "why Jerry was there" and
said that a hearing would be held in juvenile court at 3 p.m. the following day, June 9.
Officer Flagg filed a petition with the court on the hearing day,
June 9, 1964. It was not served on the Gaults and, in fact, none of them
saw this petition until the habeas corpus hearing on August 17, 1964.
The petition was entirely formal, making no reference to any factual
basis for the judicial action which it initiated. It stated only that "said
minor is under the age of 18 years and in need of the protection of this
Honorable Court [and that] said minor is a delinquent minor." It prayed
for a hearing and an order regarding "the care and custody of said
minor." Officer Flagg executed a formal affidavit in support of the
petition.
On July 9, Gerald, his mother, his older brother, and Probation
Officers Flagg and Henderson appeared before the Juvenile Judge in

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

chambers. Gerald's father was not there as he was working out of the
city. Mrs. Cook, the complainant, was not there. No one was sworn at
the hearing. No transcriptor recording was made, nor was a memorandum or record of the substance of the proceedings prepared. At this
July 9 hearing Gerald was questioned by the judge about the telephone
call, 16 and at the conclusion of the hearing the judge said he would
"think about it" and sent him back to the Detention Home. On June
1lor 12, Gerald was released after having been detained since June 8.
There was no explanation in the record as to why he was kept in the
Detention Home or why he was released. On the day of Gerald's release,
Mrs. Gault received a note signed by Officer Flagg to the effect that
"Judge McGhee has set Monday, June 15, 1964 at 11:00 a.m. as the
date and time for further hearings on Gerald's delinquency." Though
both Gerald's father and mother were present at this hearing, again the
complainant, Mrs. Cook, was not present. When Mrs. Gault asked that
Mrs. Cook be present, the judge stated that her (Mrs. Cook's) presence
was not necessary; in fact, the judge did not speak to Mrs. Cook or
communicate with her at any time.
At this June 15 hearing, a "referral report" made by the probation
officer was filed with the court, although not disclosed to Gerald or his
parents, listing the charge as "Lewd Phone Calls." At the conclusion
of the hearing, the judge committed Gerald as a juvenile delinquent to
the State Industrial School "for the period of his minority [that is, until
21], unless sooner discharged by due process of law," and an order to
that effect was entered.
Since no appeal is permitted by Arizona law in juvenile cases, a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed with the supreme court
of Arizona and referred by it to the superior court for hearing. In this
hearing the judge, upon cross-examination, stated that he had concluded
that Gerald came within ARS §8-201-6(a), which specifies that a "delinquent child" includes one "who has violated a law of the state or an
ordinance or regulation of a political subdivision thereof." The law
which Gerald was found to have violated is ARS §13-377, which provides that a person who "in the presence of or hearing of any woman
or child . . . uses vulgar, abusive or obscene language, is guilty of a
misdemeanor. . . ." The penalty specified for this offense which would
apply to an adult is $5 to $50, or imprisonment for not more than two
months. That Gault was committed to a training school for 6 years for
an allegedly identical offense borders on the ludicrous, apart from the
constitutional issue.
16 There was conflict as to what Gerald said in response to the judge's questioning. His mother claimed that Gerald said that he only dialed Mrs. Cook's
number and handed the telephone to his friend, while Officer Flagg and the
Judge were of the opinion that Gerald had admitted making one of these
lewd statements.
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The superior court dismissed the writ, and the Arizona Supreme
Court affirmed this dismissal. In reversing this determination, the United
States Supreme Court considered exclusively the following proposition :17

They urge that we hold the Juvenile Code of Arizona invalid on
its face or as applied in this case because contrary to the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment the juvenile is
taken from the custody of his parents and committed to a state
institution pursuant to proceedings in which the Juvenile Court
has virtually unlimited discretion, and in which the following
basic rights are denied:
1. Notice of the charges;
2. Right to counsel;
3. Right to confrontation and cross-examination;
4. Privilege against self-incrimination;
5. Right to a transcript of the proceedings; and
6. Right to appellate review.
Again, this discussion will be limited to number 4: The privilege against
self-incrimination.
THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
The basis of the privilege against self-incrimination is to be found
in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution:
No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself ...

18

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1967).
1 On the general subject, see GRIsWoLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY,
(1955); Hooic, COMMON SENSE AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT, (1957); ROGGE,
THE FIRST AND THE FIFTH, (1960); April, A Reappraisal of the Immunity
from Self-Incrimination, 39 MINN. L. REv. 75 (1954); Carman, A Plea for
Withdrawal of Constitutional Privilege from the Criminal, 22 MINN. L. REV.
200 (1938); Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 MIcH. L. REv. 1, 191 (1930); Fink, The Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination--A Critical Reappraisal, 13 WESTERN RES. L. REv. 722
(1962) ; Grant, Self-Incrimination in the Modern American Law, 5 TEMP.
L. Q. 368 (1931); Griswold, Right to be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U. L. REv. 216
(1960) ; Imlay, The Paradoxical Self-Incrinination Rule, 6 MiAivii L. Q.
147 (1952) ; Kemp, Background of the Fifth Amendment in England: A
Study of Its Historical Implications, 1 W & M L. REv. 247 (1958); King,
Innunity for Witnesses: An Inventory of Caveats, 40 A.B.A. J. 377 (1954);
Knox, Self-Incrimination, 74 U. PA. L. REv. 139 (1925); Kroner, SelfIncrimination: The External Reach of the Privilege, 60 CoLum. L. REv. 816
(1960) ; McGovney, Self-incriminating and Self-disgracing Testimony, 5 IowA
L. BULL. 174 (1920); McNaughten, Self-Incrimination Under Foreign Law,
45 VA. L. REv. 1299 (1959); Moreland, Historical Background and Implications of the Privilege Against Self-incrimination, 44 Ky. L. J. 267 (1956);
Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimnination, 34 MINN. L. REv. 1
17

(1949); Orfield, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimnination in Federal Cases,
25 U. PITr. L. REv. 503 (1964) ; Terry, Constitutional Provisions Against
Forcing Self-incrimination, 15 YALE L. J. 127 (1906) ; Comment, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in the Federal Courts, 70 HARV. L. Rzv. 1454
(1957); Comment, Witnesses-Privilege Against Self-Incrimination-Effect of
Incorrect Decision by Trial Judge in Compelling Answer When Privilege
Asserted, 41 MICH. L. REv. 1165 (1943).
Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426-428, (1956), stressed the importance of this privilege:
This command of the Fifth Amendment . . . registers an important
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Though the pertinent language of the Fifth Amendment is quite
clear, the history of its treatment by the courts has not been without
turmoil, particularly with reference to the applicability of the amendment to the states. The extent to which the Fourteenth Amendment's
implementing clause-". . nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty or property, without due process of law. . . ."-prevents
state invasion of rights enumerated in the first eight Amendments has
been considered in numerous cases by the Supreme Court since the
Amendment's adoption in 1868.19 From the initial position that none of
the original Amendments were to be applied against the states, the
Court has gradually come to hold that several of the Amendments came
within the implementing clause of the 14th Amendment, and hence
are to be applied against the states. Thus, although the Court as late
as 1922 said that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor any other
provision of the Constitution of the United States imposes upon the
States any restrictions about 'freedom of speech' . . ,"o three years
later Gitlow v. New York 21 initiated a series of decisions which today
holds immune from state invasion every First Amendment protection
for the freedoms of speech, press, religion, assembly, association, and
petition for redress of grievances.
The Fourth Amendment has had a similar history. Although Palko
v. Connecticut12 suggested that the rights secured by the Fourth Amend-

ment were not protected against state action, citing Weeks v. United
States23 that "the 4th Amendment is not directed to individual misconduct of [state] officials," in 1961 Mapp v. Ohio 24 held that it was taken
as settled that ". . . the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been

declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause
advance in the development of our liberty--'one of the great landmarks in
man's struggle to make himself civilized.' Time has not shown that protection from the evils against which this safe-guard was directed is needless or unwarranted. This constitutional protection must not be interpreted
in a hostile or niggardly spirit. Too many, even those who should be
better advised, view this privilege as a shelter for wrongdoers. They too
readily assume that those who invoke it are either guilty of crime or
commit perjury in claiming the privilege. Such a view does scant honor
to the patriots who sponsored the Bill of Rights as a condition to acceptance of the Constitution by the ratifying States. The founders of the
Nation were not naive or disregardful of the interests of justice....
No doubt the constitutional privilege may, on occasion, save a guilty
man from his just deserts. It was aimed at a more far-reaching evil-a
recurrence of the Inquisition and the Star Chamber, even if not in their
stark brutality. Prevention of the greater evil was deemed of more importance than occurrence of the lesser evil. Having had much experience
with a tendency in human nature to abuse power, the Founders sought to
close the doors against like future abuses by law-enforcing agencies.
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
20 Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 543 (1922).
21 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1952).
22302 U.S. 319 (1938).
23232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
24367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
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Again, although the Court held in 1942 that

in a state prosecution for a noncapital offense, "appointment of counsel
is not a fundamental right," 25 in 1963 this decision was re-examined
and it was held that provision of counsel in all criminal cases was "a
fundamental right, essential to a fair trial,' 26 and thus was made obligatory on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.
What has been the fate of the 5th Amendment? In Adamson v.
California,27 the appellant Adamson was convicted of murder in the
first degree. During the course of trial, the judge commented on the
failure of Adamson to take the stand based upon a California statute
which permitted the failure of a defendant to explain or to deny evidence
against him to be commented upon by court and by counsel and to be
considered by court and jury. The appellant, an ex-convict, failed to
take the stand due to the interpretation of another California statute
holding that "if the defendant, after answering affirmatively charges
alleging prior convictions, takes the witness stand to deny or explain
away other evidence that has been introduced, the commission of these
crimes can be revealed to the jury on cross-examination to impeach his
testimony." Thus, an accused who is a repeated offender is forced to
choose between the risk of having his prior offenses disclosed to the
jury or of having the jury draw harmful inferences from uncontradicted
evidence that can only be denied or explained by the defendant. In
refusing to accept the appellant's argument that the provision of the
Fifth Amendment that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself" is a fundamental national privilege
or immunity protected against state abridgment by the Fourteenth
Amendment or a privilege or immunity secured, through the Fourteenth
Amendment, against deprivation by state action because it is a personal
right, enumerated in the federal Bill of Rights, the court stated:
It is settled law that the clause of the Fifth Amendment,
protecting a person against being compelled to be a witness
against himself, is not made effective by the Fourteenth Amendment.., the Bill of Rights, when adopted, was for the protection
of the individual against the federal government and its provisions were inapplicable to similar actions done by the states.
We reaffirm the conclusion of the Twining and Palko cases
that protection against self-incrimination
is not a privilege or im28
munity of national citizenship.
Justice Black, in a vigorous dissent, however, urged that the intent
of the framers was to make the Bill of Rights applicable to the states.
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 471 (1942).
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-344 (1963).
27 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
28 Id. at 50, 51, 53. See also Frankfurter's concurring opinion elaborating the
position against the incorporation of the Bill of Rights into prohibitions
against the states.

25
26
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In my judgment that history conclusively demonstrates that
the language of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment,
taken as a whole, was thought by those responsible for its submission to the people, and by those who opposed its submission
sufficiently explicit to guarantee that thereafter no state could
deprive its citizens of the privileges and protections of the Bill
of Rights.
If the choice must be between the selective process of the
Palko decision applying some of the Bill of Rights to the States,
or the Twining rule applying none of them, I would choose the
Palko selective process. But rather than accept either of these
choices, I would follow what I believe was the original purpose
of the Fourteenth Amendment-to extend to all the people of
the nation the complete protection of the Bill of Rights." (Emphasis added.)
In Cohen v.Hurley,30 a state disbarred an attorney who claimed the
privilege against self-incrimination in the course of a judicial investigation of unethical practices by lawyers. The Court upheld the disbarment
on the theory that the state's action was reasonable based upon the
special responsibility of lawyers. However, the decision was 5-4, with
the dissenting opinion, written by Justice Brennan, agreeing that the
state's action violated the privilege against self-incrimination.
The [self-incrimination] privilege is rightly designated 'one
of the great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself
civilized.' . . . I would hold that the full sweep of the Fifth

Amendment privilege has been absorbed in the Fourteenth
Amendment.31
In Malloy v. Hogan,3 2 the Court partially accepted the Cohen dissent
in overruling the Twining and Adamson cases and holding that the
Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination is also protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by the states. The
petitioner was arrested for "pool-selling" and placed on probation after
his sentence was suspended after 90 days of imprisonment. About 16
months after his guilty plea, petitioner was ordered to testify before a
county court appointed referee who was conducting an inquiry into alleged gambling in the county. When the petitioner refused to answer
questions related to events surrounding his arrest and conviction, he
was found to be in contempt, and was committed to prison. "We hold
Id. at 74, 75, 89.
30366 U.S. 117 (1961).
31 Id. at 160. For an earlier expression of Mr. Justice Brennan's view that once
a right specifically protected in the Bill of Rights is recognized as a fundamental right under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
it has the same meaning as a limitation on the states as it had in the Bill of
Rights as a limitation on the federal government, see his opinion in Ohio
ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960). See also Mr. Justice Brennan's
lecture, "The Bill of Rights and the States," printed in 36 N.Y.U. L. REv. 761
(1961).
3 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
29
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that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed the petitioner the protection
of the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. .... '
Griffin v. California- expressly affirmed Malloy the next year.
Numerous cases have discussed the effect of immunity on the selfincrimination privilege, whether the privilege is available in an investigative proceeding by a grand jury or Congressional committee, and
waiver of the privilege, 35 but such is not our concern here. Of primary
concern is the rule of law that the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against
self-incrimination has now been brought to bear upon the states. Thus,
the question becomes: Of what significance is Malloy to the juvenile
court? Before discussing the Gault case, which directly answers this
question, it might be well to state the standard arguments against making the privilege applicable in juvenile proceedings, 36 as these arguments
are effectively refuted in Gault:
1. Confession and self-examination embody important therapeutic values; for example, "in order to rehabilitate a child, he
must first admit his crime and so be aware that he is in need
of rehabilitation;
2. Encouragement of testimony convinces the youth of the judge's
concern for him;
3. Enforcement of the privilege would permit some youths to
avoid delinquency adjudications.
In holding that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination
was fully applicable to juvenile proceedings, the Court met head-on with
argument that juvenile proceedings are "civil" and not
the time-worn
"criminal," 37 and therefore the privilege should not apply. Though the
Fifth Amendment uses the term "criminal"-"no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself"-the Court
stated that the availability of the privilege turns upon the nature of the
statement or admission and the exposure which it invites, rather than
the type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked.3 8 For in
331d. at 3.
34
380 U.S. 609 (1965).
3

5E.g., Slochower v. Board of Higher Education of New York City, 350 U.S.
551 (1956) ; Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956) ; Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958) ; Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41 (1959) ; Emspak
v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955); Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S.

367 (1951).

36 Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Courts, 67 COLUM, L. REv.
281,331 (1967).
7 Id. at 330.
38387 U.S. 1, 46 (1967). See Note, Juvenile Justice: Treatment or Travesty, 11
PiTT. L. REv. 277, 279 (1949) :
Concealing the walls of the institution with cleverly placed foilage might
serve to produce more the appearance of a home, but it does little to
diminish the capacity of those walls to limit effectively the freedom of

activity of the unfortunates therein. Personal independence is restricted-

be it for purposes punitive or purposes remedial.
See also Antieau, ConstitutionalRights in Juvenile Courts,46 CORNELL L. Q.

387, 392 (1961): "If ever words have obscured issues of legal and consti-

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

Murphy v. Waterfront Commission,3 9 Mr. Justice White stated: "The
[Fifth Amendment] privilege can be claimed in any proceeding, be it
criminal or civil, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory
... it protects any disclosures which the witness may reasonably apprehend could be used in a criminal prosecution or which could lead to
other evidence that might be so used." (Emphasis supplied.) This would
seem to be sound reasoning, for juvenile proceedings instituted to determine delinquency may lead to commitment to a state institution,
either by transfer 40 or by waiver of jurisdiction directly to an adult
41
criminal court, and thereby could easily fit within the language of

tutional right, it is the unfortunate language of 'non-criminal,' 'non-punishment,' and 'protective' indulged in by the legislatures and the courts."
See also Judge Holtzoff's opinion in United States v. Dickerson, 168 F. Supp.
899, 901 (D. D.C. 1958), rez'd 271 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1959), discussed in
45 VA.L. REv.436 (1959).

See also Rubin & Shaffer, Constitutional Protections for the Juvenile, 44
L. J.66 (1967).

DENVER

In accord: In re Contreress, 109 Cal. App.2d 787, 241 P.2d 631 (1952);
People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932) ; In re Holmes, 379 Pa.

599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954).
39 378 U.S. 52, 94 (1964).

40 E.g., WIS. STATS. §48.34 (1965), allows the court, upon a finding of delinquency,
to make an order transferringlegal custody of the child to the Department of
Public Welfare, who then can transfer the child to a state institution. However, this miscarriage of justice would be alleviated by the proposed §48.515
in Wisconsin. This statute would provide many procedural safeguards for
the minor in legal custody of the public welfare department on an adjudication of delinquency before he can be transferred to an adult correctional institution. A hearing by the juvenile review board, with counsel provided,
if desired, would be assured the minor, and a transfer by such board can only
be made if they find that: (1) the minor is a danger to the safety of others,
or (2) the minor is not amenable to treatment in juvenile facilities available
to the court, or (3) treatment at the adult institution will better serve the
interest and rehabilitation of the child. In addition, the order of the juvenile
board would be appealable.
41 E.g., WIS. STATS. §48.18 (1965). Jurisdiction of criminal and civil courts over
children 16 or older:
(1) Except as provided in sub. (2) and s. 253.18(2), the criminal and
civil courts shall have jurisdiction over a child 16 or older who is alleged
to have violated a state law or a county or municipal ordinance only if
the juvenile court judge deems it contrary to the best interests of such
child or of the public to hear the case and enters an order waiving his
jurisdiction and referring the matter to the district attorney, corporation
counsel or city attorney, for appropriate proceedings in a criminal or
civil court. In that event, the district attorney, corporation counsel or city
attorney of the county or municipality shall proceed with the case in the
same manner as though the jurisdiction of the juvenile court had never
attached.
(2) In counties having a population of 500,000 or more and having a
traffic-misdemeanor court branch, the concurrent jurisdiction of said
court branch pursuant to s. 48.17 shall not be dependent upon any such
order of the juvenile court judge waiving his jurisdiction, and cases specified in said section may be brought and heard initially before the trafficmisdemeanor court branch.
However, repeal and recreation of this section has been recommended to the
Wisconsin legislature as a consequence of the Kent case, which held that
the child has a right to a waiver hearing with the assistance of counsel at
such hearing, that counsel have access to the records and reports that are
considered by the court, and that the judge must state the specific reason "wv
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court has been waived. The proposed §48.18
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"criminal" for the purposes of self-incrimination. Applying the facts of
this case, when Gerald Gault was interrogated he had no assurance that
he would not be treated as an adult in criminal court.
As to the alleged therapeutic value of a confession unhindered by
the right to silencethe Court was highly dubious.42 The Court's position here is unassailable, for it is difficult to fathom how any good
purpose can result from deprivation of the fundamental right to remain
silent in a proceeding against oneself. Rather, it is more reasonable to
believe that a juvenile would be hostile when his paternally induced
statements result in confinement on the basis of his "confession." In
addition, there is much doubt as to the reliability and trustworthiness of
"confessions" by juveniles, as evidenced in Haley v. Ohio.4 3
Contrary to the fears of many, this does not mean that admissions
and legitimate confessions of the juvenile will no longer be available
to the court. However, it does mean that counsel is no longer a "nicety"
in juvenile court, but is a necessity to the same extent as in criminal
courts." Thus if counsel is not present where an admission is obtained,
the court must take great care to ensure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it has not been coerced or suggested, but
also that it is not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent
fantasy, fright, or despair. 4- Therefore, an additional factor must be
considered by the juvenile judge in making his determination as to the
voluntariness of a confession: the fact that an adolescent is involved.
Wigmore states that "The principle, then, upon which a confession may
be excluded is that it is, under certain conditions, testimonially untrustworthy."46 (Emphasis added.) That there are additional factors in determining testimonial untrustworthiness where a juvenile is involved
can hardly be doubted. In Haley v. Ohio,47 where the Supreme Court
provides for all of the above in felony cases and serious misdemeanors. Another subsection would establish criteria to assist the judge in making the
determination of whether or not to waive the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court.
42 387 U.S. 1, 48 (1967).
43332 U.S. 596 (1948). See also, In the Matter of Four Youths, Nos. 2,-776-J,
28-778-J, 28-778-3, 28-859-_, Juvenile Court of the District of Columbia, April

7, 1961.

44 See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) and Miranda v. Arizona, 384

U.S. 436 (1966).

4In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 52
46 WIrioRE, EVIDENCE §822

(1967).
(3d ed. 1940). Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478,

488, 489 (1964) offers food for thought on the general desirability of confessions: "We have learned the lesson of history, ancient and modern, that
a system of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on the 'confession' will, in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than
a system which depends on extrinsic evidence, independently secured through
skillful investigation."

47332 U.S. 596 (1948). The facts: a confectionarv store was robbed and its
owners shot. Five days later-around midnight-Haley, aged 15, was arrested
at his home and taken to police headquarters. There was conflicting evidence
as to whether he was beaten there, but it was uncontroverted that, beginning
shortly after midnight, Haley was questioned by the police for about five
hours. Five or six policemen questioned him in relays of one or two each.
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reversed the conviction of a 15-year-old boy for murder, Mr. Justice
Douglas gave express recognition to this additional factor:
What transpired would make us pause for careful inquiry if
a mature man were involved. And when, as here, a mere childan easy victim of the law-is before us, special care in scrutinizing
the record must be used. Age 15 is a tender and difficult age for
a boy of any race. He cannot be judged by the more exacting
standards of maturity. That which would leave a man cold and
unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens.
This is the period of great instability which the crisis of adolescence produces. A 15-year-old lad, questioned through the dead
of night by relays of police, is a ready victim of the inquisition. 4
In Gallegos v. Colorado49 the Court once again reiterated this position:
He cannot be compared with an adult in full possession of
his senses and knowledgeable of the consequences of his admissions. He would have no way of knowing what the consequences
of his confession were without advice as to his rights-from
someone concerned with securing those rights-and without the
aid of more mature judgment as to the steps he should take in
the predicament in which he found himself. .

.

. Adult advice

would have put him on a less unequal footing with his interrogators. Without some adult protection against this inequality, a
14-year-old boy would not be able to know, let alone assert, such
constitutional rights as he had. To allow this conviction to stand
would, in effect, be to treat him as if he had no constitutional
rights. (Emphasis added.)
Haley had no counsel nor was he advised of such a right-around 5 A.M.after being shown alleged confessions of two accomplices, he confessed. After
signing a question and answer-type written confession, which included an
introductory paragraph stating the constitutional right to remain silent, Haley
was put in jail and held incommunicado for 3 days. A lawyer retained by his
mother tried to see him twice but was refused admission by the police. His
mother was not allowed to see him until 5 days after the arrest, but a newspaper photographer was allowed to visit and take his picture immediately after
he confessed! Haley was not taken before a magistrate and formally charged
with a crime until 3 days after the confession was signed.
48 Id. at 599.
49 370 U.S. 49 (1962). The facts: Gallegos, a 14-year-old boy, and another juvenile followed an elderly man to a hotel, got into his room on a ruse, assaulted
and overpowered him, stole $13 from his pockets and fled. Picked up 12 days
later by police, Gallegos immediately admitted the assault and robberty. Over
two weeks later he was convicted in a juvenile court of "assault to injure"
and was committed to the State Industrial School for an indeterminate period.
Subsequently the victim died, and Gallegos was charged with first degree
murder and found guilty by a jury in a state court. The crucial evidence
introduced at the trial was a formal confession which Gallegos had signed
before his victim died, before he had been brought before a judge, and after
he had been held for five days without seeing a lawyer, parent or other
friendly adult, although his mother attempted to see him.
Although the Gallegos court addressed itself only to the use of the confession in a criminal court, the language of the opinion indicates an identical
result would have been reached had there been no waiver and the confession
been tendered to the juvenile court on a petition to declare Gallegos a delinquent.
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The New York Court of Appeals and the supreme court of New Jersey
have found in a similar vein, and the same principle is espoused in the
New York Family Court Act50 and the Standards for Juvenile and
Family Courts. 51 It is important to note, however, that the Court has not
stated that any one particular procedural practice is per se a violation
52
of due process. As stated in Gallegos:
There is no guide to the decision of cases such as this, except
the totality of circumstances... The youth of the petitioner, the
long detention, the failure to send for his parents, the failure
immediately to bring him before the judge of the Juvenile Court,
the failure to see to it that he had the advice of a lawyer or a
friend-all these combine to make us conclude that the formal
confession on which this conviction may have rested (citation
omitted) was obtained in violation of due process. (Emphasis
added.)
The basic issue in Gault, therefore, was whether the proceedings in
Juvenile Court were to be deemed "criminal" in nature. Once this basic
determination was made, the more refined issue appeared: Whether
Gault's admission could be used against him when there was no evidence
offered that he had knowledge that he was not obliged to speak and
would not be penalized for remaining silent, with proper consideration
given his propensities as an adolescent on the issue of voluntariness of
confession.
To answer this, the pertinent Gault facts must be recapitulated. The
"confession" of Gerald Gault was first obtained by Officer Flagg, out
of the presence of Gerald's parents, without counsel and without advising him of his right to counsel. The judgment of the Juvenile Court
was stated by the judge to be based on Gerald'sadmission in court. No
record or writing of any type substantiated the confession. Apart from
this "admission," there was nothing upon which a judgment or finding
might be based. There was no sworn testimony. Mrs. Cook, the complainant, was not present.
Once the juvenile delinquency proceeding was determined to be
"criminal" in nature, the Supreme Court's decision in In re Gault is
hardly surprising: this was an invalid confession as the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination is applicable in the case of juveniles
in the same manner as with respect to adults. The present law: absent
a valid confession, a determination of delinquency and an order of commitment to a state institution cannot be sustained in the absence of
sworn testimony subjected to the opportunity for cross-examination in
53
accordance with our law and constitutional requirements.
50 N.Y. FAmILY COURT AcT §741 (1962).
p. 49.
52 370 U.S. 49, 55 (1962).
53 One of the remaining unanswered issues is whether the McNabb-Mallory ex51 STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURTS,

clusionary rule of evidence will be applied in juvenile proceedings as a con-
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This application of the privilege against self-incrimination has not
met with universal approval, and in fact, has been considered by some
to be destructive of the rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile court
system. Indeed, this criticism should not be surprising since the privilege
has been bitterly attacked in its application to adults as well. 54 In regard
to the juvenile courts, the basic objection to the application of this
privilege is the one discussed earlier in this article: Confession is good
for the juvenile and, in fact, is a necessary element for his rehabilitation.
This position, upon which the supreme court of Arizona based its decision, has been advocated by numerous scholars. The standard attack is
exemplified by the following:
The denial of the right against self-incrimination may be
justified on several grounds. First, the child is not incriminating
himself since criminal conviction cannot result ....

Second, the

child should be encouraged to admit his guilt as an important
psychological step on the road to reformation. Third, a refusal
to testify could not be 'punished' but would be merely further
evidence that the child is antagonistic toward society and in need
of guidance. Finally, no prosecuting attorney is present to twist
the meaning of the
child's words or to employ the tricks of
55
cross-examination.

Modifications in the applicability of the privilege to juvenile proceedings have also been proferred as an alternative solution. A recent
article gives credence to the privilege in juvenile proceedings, but would
hold the right not applicable (1) in cases that could not be "prosecuted
under the general law" and (2) in all other cases when the juvenile
court has determined that it will not dismiss the petition but will exercise its exclusive jurisdiction over the child.5 6
sequence of the recognition of a juvenile's right to silence in such proceedings. A strong argument for the applicability could seemingly be made. See
Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile
Cases, 1966 Sup. CT. REv. 167; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966);
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) ; Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964)
Harling v. United States, 295 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. en banc, 1961) ; Harrison
v. United States, 359 F.2d 214 (D.C. Cir. en banc, 1965).
54Quick, Constitutional Rights In the Juvenile Court, 12 HOWARD L. 3. 76, 103
(1966).
55 Note, The Parens PatriaeTheory and Its Effect on the Constitutional Limits
of Juvenile Court Powers, 27 PiTr. L. REv. 887, 910 (1966). Also, Polow,
The Juvenile Court: Effective Justice or Benevolent Despotisn, 53 A.B.A. J.
31 (Jan. 1967). Polow prefaced his discussion on p. 34 with "A procedural
nicety is not necessarily applicable because it is required in criminal courts."
(Emphasis added.) One can only doubt the conclusion reached by Polow
when he implies that basic constitutional safeguards are mere "procedural
niceties." The position of Felix Frankfurter is much more laudable: "The
history of American freedom is, in no small measure, the history of procedure." Malinski v. People of State of New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945)
(concurring opinion). Also see Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41
MINN. L. REV. 547, 561 (1957) : "If the juvenile proceeding is truly protective
and non-accusatory in character, there can be little need for a privilege
against testifying similar to the privilege against self-incrimination. The
latter privilege is tied to the accusatorial scheme of the criminal law."
56 VAeinstein & Goodman, A Constructive Response for Juvenile Courts, 53
A.B.A. J. 257 (March 1967).
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A better approach is offered in a recent Note.57 The author suggests
a model judicial court structure involving (1) a non-judicial intake
service empowered to adjust all cases, whose proceedings are totally
veiled from judicial cognizance at the adjudicative hearing; (2) a hearing on the merits; and (3) a disposition hearing. At the intake proceeding the youth would be permitted counsel but strict adherence to Fifth
Amendment rules regarding self-incrimination would be unnecessary,
for testimony elicited at the intake interview and evidence accumulated
by the social work investigation would not be admissible to determine
the issue of guilt at the later court hearing. This differs from the previously mentioned modification in that the testimony would not be
admissible in the juvenile hearing on the merits, whereas the former
would restrict the privilege only to a consequent adult criminal trial.
Regarding the latter, if the case reaches the juvenile court and the youth
does not then admit the allegations of the petition, the judge would then
hold a hearing on the merits to determine whether the charges are
substantiated. In this hearing the privilege against self-incrimination
would be rigorously applied. 58 Then if the allegations of the petition
were established, the judge would proceed to the dispositional hearing,
where his first duty would be to establish jurisdiction by establishing
that the youth requires, and can benefit from, the rehabilitative aids of
the juvenile system, which would necessarily involve a consideration of
all the social evidence, including the testimony of the youth. This would
seem to be a most reasonable alternative as the conflict between the rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile court and the status of the juvenile
court as a court of law would be largely resolved: By postponing any
dispositional decisions until the conclusion of the adjudicative hearing,
the knowledge of the judge would be broadened at the dispositional
hearing while the danger of prejudice to the youth arising from the
judge's reference to evidence which is inadmissible on the question of
guilt, would be alleviated.
This model act is not a panacea to the conflict between the rehabilitative function of the juvenile court and the concept of such court
as a court of law. For example, the suggested procedure of having the
57 Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Courts, 67 CoLum. L.

REv.

281 (1967).

58 See Welch, Delinquency Proceedings-FundamentalFairnessfor the Accused

in a Quasi-CriminalForum, 50 MINN. L. REv. 653, 663 (1966):
The juvenile has every right under the Fourteenth Amendment to
decline surrendering his liberty in return for "guidance," and to lead
his life without official interference until such time as the state can prove
in an orderly and reliable procedure that his conduct justifies state inAfter such a determination has been made
fringement of his liberty ....
the commendable motives and objectives of reformation and rehabilitation
do credit to our society. Before such a determination has been made,
however, these objectives are merely expedient apologies for stripping
proceedings of safeguards designed to ensure standards of reliability consistent with the degree of state power being exercised. (Emphasis added.)
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non-judicial intake proceeding first, then the judicial hearing on the
merits (a proceeding in which constitutional privileges, including selfincrimination, would apply), then a dispositional hearing wherein all
social evidence would be admissible, would be confusing to the youth
and most probably destructive of the goal of rehabilitation. For he
would be encouraged to "open up" at the intake proceeding and then
be instructed by counsel not to incriminate himself at the subsequent
judicial hearing on the merits. It is hard to imagine that this would not
smack of "playing games" to the youth, and hinder his respect for the
law in society, a necessary element to his rehabilitation.
It is this author's opinion that the bifurcated proceeding is indeed
the best approach to resolving the essential conflict, but that the intake
procedure should be merged with the hearing on the merits, with constitutional safeguards and privileges applicable in what would amount to
a full-blown criminal trial. Upon the determination by the trier of fact
(court or jury) that an offense was committed, and that the defendant
youth was the perpetrator, a dispositional hearing would ensue in which
the full resources of the public welfare department and the social
services in the community could be utilized to determine the precise
treatment of the youth which would most effectively lead to his rehabilitation while protecting the community in the process.
The most serious objection to such a proceeding would be that the
juvenile court system simply could not handle the resultant increase in
case-load. Admittedly, the volume of court proceedings would greatly
increase for many of the cases previously dismissed at the non-judicial
intake procedure based upon information gained therein, would now
be going to trial. It is submitted that the increase in juvenile court
facilities would be well worth the price, and, in fact, if constitutional
privileges are to be applied across the board in juvenile court in the near
future as Gault seems to indicate, that such development will be necessary. It seems plausible also that the judge would be able to dismiss
those cases which have no merit with the same facility as the non-judicial
intake proceeding would be able to dismiss.
In the absence of such a model act, however, the fact remains that
any modification of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination
is not possible. Nothing less than the full constitutional privilege is to
be tolerated; mere partial, or even substantial compliance is to be given
the same weight as the defense of being "just a little bit pregnant."
Consistent due process in juvenile proceedings will involve large expenditures, inconvenience, and might even hamper the most effective
consideration of the needs of an individual child. But the gains inherent
in the application of the due process concept would seem to justify such
implementation.
In any event, it is likely that this matter of self-incrimination in
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juvenile proceedings will be spelled out more fully, for there is an
appeal now pending in the Supreme Court regarding the admissibility
of confessions in juvenile court. The precise issue in In re Fischer:9
Do the Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments bar admission in Ohio juvenile court proceedings of a police station
confession made in the absence of counsel by a 17-year-old boy
who was not advised of his right to remain silent and -who later
testified that the confession was false and involuntary?
It is submitted that the values underlying the privilege against selfincrimination-integrity of the person, confidence in the accusatorial
system and distrust of compelled testimony-are worth preserving
within the juvenile court framework. 0 Indeed, as a corollary, a system
which prevents the exercise of a fundamental constitutional privilege
is not worth preserving.CONCLUSION

The basic conflict in the juvenile court system appears to be the
alleged dichotomy between the rehabilitative function of the juvenile
court and the concept of the juvenile court as a court of law, with the
consequent safeguards of the Constitution of the United States. That
these two philosophies are not incompatible and can co-exist, indeed
must co-exist, is the fundamental determination of Gault.61 In regard to
the constitutional privilege discussed in this article-the privilege against
self-incrimination-it is recognized that special problems may arise
with respect to waiver, and that such factors as the age of the child and
the presence of parents must be considered when a juvenile is involved.
However, it can no longer be debated whether the basic principle of
the privilege is applicable to the juvenile proceeding. As stated by
Gault's precursor, with respect to waiver proceedings, "there is no place
in our system of law for reaching a result of such tremendous consequences without ceremony .... 62
Thus the juvenile court has come of age as a court of law in In re
Gault. But its final maturation is some time away as, similar to the
adolescent, there are problems in the maturation process. In holding
juvenile court proceedings to be of a "criminal" nature, the Court has
rectified the heretofore repugnant practices in regard to self-incrimination, but may have opened a veritable "Pandora's box." Though limiting the scope of its holding to the delinquency proceeding itself, several
basic questions remain unanswered. Should the McNabb-Mallory ex59 36 U.S. L. W. 3037 (cert. granted,Oct. 9, 1967).
60 See Note, Rights and Rehabilitationin the Jiuvenile Courts, 67 CoLum. L. REV.

281 (1967).

61As

early as 1944, Pound advocated a return to "legalism" in the juvenile

court system. POUND, THE JUVENILE COURT AND THE LAW (1944). It should

also be pointed out that there is little in Gault that was not previously enunci-

ated in THE STANDARD JUVENILE COURT ACT (6th ed. 1959) and the COUNcIL
OF JUDGES" PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN THE JUVENILE COURT

62Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966).

(1962).
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clusionary rule of evidence be applied in juvenile proceedings as a consequence of the recognition of a juvenile's right to silence in such
proceedings? Should the standard of proof be changed from a "preponderance" of the evidence to the criminal test of "beyond a reasonable
doubt ?" At what time must counsel be appointed? Must the Miranda
warning be given to juveniles? May a finding of delinquency now be
used to impeach a juvenile's testimony as a witness in a subsequent civil
or criminal proceeding? Must the juvenile court provide a jury upon
request? Does the juvenile have a right to bail? What compulsory
processes are available for obtaining witnesses?
One would hope that the Court will give careful consideration to the
ramifications and effect upon the rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile
court system which would follow from wholesale application of criminal
procedures to the juvenile court. The Gault language would seem to
indicate that such across-the-board adoption may be forthcoming. This
writer sees a threat to the very existence of the juvenile court system
by such adoption, for its effect would be to make the juvenile court a
full-fledged criminal court, with the juvenile given no special consideration due to his age and proclivities. This would be an anomalous situation, since the juvenile court was instituted to prevent this very thing.
Whatever the long-range implications of Gault, it is evident that the
convenient theories of "parens patriae," "non-criminal proceeding," and
"rehabilitative purpose solely," will no longer be allowed to run roughshod over the basic constitutional rights of the juvenile. For it finally
has been recognized that these theories and their corollaries result in,
at best, "benevolent despotism." Though admittedly there is great security in hindsight, one can only wonder why this realization was so
slow in coming.
JAMES E.

DUFFY, JR.

